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-IN '1'HE

L:R:H I~

SUPJ<Et1E

COURT OF TIIE STl\TE OF UTAH

ZAMOR/\,
Plaintiff,
l\ppellant,
-vs-

CASE NUMBER

17263

LORIN DRAPER, ROBERT B.
CLEMENTS and JOE GREINER,
Defendants,
Respondents.

-------------------------------------------,-----------------BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant sued respondents for injuries suffered
on June 9, 1979, in Ogden City, when respondents attacked and
severely beat appellant.

Appellant sued respondents as private

individuals and not in their capacity as police officers.
Respondents made a Motion to Dismiss based on the ground that
before filing an action against police officers a bond must be
filed in accordance with Utah Code Annotated §78-11-10 (1977).
Appellants contend that since respondents were being sued as
private individuals, a bond need not be filed.
by imposing

Furthermore,

a bond under these circumstances, a poor person,

such as the appellant who had filed an Affidavit of Impecuniosity,
would be denied access to the Courts.
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DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents

v;,15

granted by Third District Judge, Ronald 0. Hyde, on July 21,
1980.

The Court held that the action "[arose] out of, or in

the course of,

the performance of the defendants' duties as

police officers, and a bond must be filed before filing

act~n

against said defendants".
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Lower Court's Order of Dismissal

should~

reversed because:
a.

A bond need not be filed in this action,

since it is brought against the respondents as private individuoj
who were acting far beyond the normal range of legitimate police[
I

conduct; and
b.

Section 78-11-10 of the Utah Code

i
Annotated, I

providing for the imposition of a bond prior to filing an
against police officers, is unconstitutional on its face and

I

as applied because it denies access to the courts to those unabl'.,
to afford the cost of posting a bond.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I

Appellant is an unskilled laborer of "lexicdn-Ame•l
descent who manages to support his family of six th rough penoc:j
work as a security guard.

Because appellant's income is belm1

the officially established poverty level he filed an 7\ffidavit
of Impecuniosity at the time of filinq his action.
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On June 9, 1979, in Oqde>n City at the corner
of Washinyton and 31st Street, appellant joined his children
and brother-in-law to talk and socialize.

Defendants approached

the group and proceede>d to remove them from the corner by using
loud, insulting abusive and threatening language.

Appellant

then entered his home, located approximately one-hundred
feet from the corner, and contacted defendants' supervisor
to complain about the abusive action undertaken by the
defendants.

Upon coming out of his home defendants attacked

the appellant without any cause or provocation.
hit, kicked and choke>d the appellant.

Defendants

That as a result of

the attack appellant suffered abrasions, cuts, contusions
on his body and head; and, muscle spasms around the neck.
Appellant also incurred $193.63 in medical expenses.
Appellant's attorney studiously drafted his
complaint so as to state a cause of action against the defendants
in their individual capacity.

At no time has appellant

tried to attach the defendants' bond; and, appellant has
refrained from sueing the City of Ogden or including the
City of Ogden as a defendant in this suit.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRJ\NTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY
FRAMED AS BEING AGAINST DEFENDANTS
INDIVIDUALLY AND DEFENDANTS DID NOT SHOW
BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANTS ACTS WERE WITHIN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES.
Utah Code Annotated §78-11-10 provides:
Before any action may be filed against
any sheriff, constable, peace officer,
state road officer, or any other person
charged with the duty of enfo~cement of
the criminal laws of this state, or
service of civil process, when such
action arises out of, or in the course
of the performance of his duty, or in
any action upon the bond of any such
officer, the proposed plaintiff, as a
condition precedent thereto, shall
prepare and file with, and at the time
of filing the complaint in any such
action, a written undertaking with at
least two sufficient sureties in an
amount to be fixed by the court, conditioned upon the diligent prosecution of
such action, and, in the event judgment
in the said cause shall be against the
plaintiff, for the payment to the
defendant of all costs and expenses that
may be awarded against such plaintiff,
including a reasonable attorney's fee
to be fixed by the court.
In any such
action, the prevailing party therein shall,
in addition to an award of costs as
otherwise provided, recover from the
losing party therein such sum as counsel
fees as shall be allowed by the court.
The official bond of any such officer
shall be liable for any such costs and
attorneys fees.
(Emphasis added).
From the plain meaning of the underlined provisions above, it
would appear that a bond need be posted only when a plaintiff
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sues police officers acting in the "course of the performance
of" their duties as police officers, but not if he sues them
in their private capacity when they have acted far beyond the
normal range of legitimate police conduct.

This interpretation

is borne out by Utah case law.
The facts in Wright v. Lee, 101 Utah 76, 118 P.2d
132 (1941)

are similar to those in the instant case.

In Wright

the plaintiff brought a complaint against several police
officers for personal injuries caused by the officers.

The

complaint evidenced a "studious attempt" to sue the officers as individual

.

and alleqed tJ13t t11ey had acted far beyond the range of their
official duties.

Furthermore, the suit in that case did not

purport to be against the officers' bonds.

The attorney for

the defendants in the Wright case moved to dismiss the plaintiff's
action since plaintiff had not posted a bond as required by
Chapter 148, Laws of Utah, 1937,

(predecessor to U.C.A. §78-11-10)

which provided in part:
In any action brought against any sheriff,
constable, peace officer, state road
officer, or any other person charged with
the duty of enforcement of the criminal
laws of this state, or service of civil
process, when any such action arises out
of, or in the course of, the performance
of his duty, or in any action upon the bond
of any such officer, the prevailing party
therein shall, in addition to an award of
costs as otherwise provided by law, recover
from the losing party therein such sum as
counsel fees as shall be allowed by the
court. The official bond of any such officer
shall be liable for any such costs and
attorney fees.
Before any such action is
filed, and as a condition precedent thereto,
the proposed plaintiff shall prepare and file
with, and at the time of filing, the complaint
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in any such action, a written undertaking
with at least two sufficient sureties in an
amount to be fixed by the court, conditioned
upon the diligent prosecution of such action
and, in the event judgment in the said cause'
shall be against the plaintiff, for the
payment to the defendant of all costs and
expenses that may be awarded against such
plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney's
fee to be fixed by the court.
Wright v.
Lee, supra., at 135.
The lower court in Wright granted defendants' Motion to Dismi5'
but the Utah Supreme Court, on appeal, reversed the lower court
and held that no bond was required of the plaintiff where the
suit was brought against officers as indi victuals.

In so rulin,,

l,

the Court distinguished the Wright facts fro~ those of an earlie:(
case which had required a bond, Kiesel v. District Court, 96
156, 84 P.2d 782

(1939).

I

The Court noted:

The instant case differs from the cited
case, in that in the Kiesel case, the
action was against the officers, as
officers, and was also against the
officers' bondsman.
The instant case
is an attempt to sue the defendants, not
as officers, but as private individuals
and the complaint evidences a studious
attempt to limit this action to a private
personal suit for which the bond of the
officers would not be looked to for relief.
Wright v. Lee, ~upra., at 134.
The Supreme Court in Wright found that there was no evidence
presented to support the Motion to Dismiss and so reversed it
and remanded the case to the District Court.

In Wright the

appellant had also raised the issue whether the statute requinn:[
the posting of a b6nd is constitutional.

The Supreme Court

I

declined to rule on this issue, because no evidence was prcsentecl
that would require the posting of a bond:
The constitutionality of the statute
cannot be passed on, upon this appeal
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as the action was instituted as a personal
action and there is no evidence to invoke
the application of the statute. Wright v.
Lee, supra., at 135.
The Wright case, after remand, went up to the
Supreme Court of Utah a second time, Wright v. Lee, 104 Utah 90,
138 P.2d 246

(1943) (hereinafter referred to as Wright II).

The

trial court, after remand in the first Wright case, had dismissed
plaintiff's complaint a second time with a conclusory rationale
that the defendants were police officers and that they 'were
acting as such police officers and this action ... arose out of
or in the course of the performance of the c4.ity ... as peace
officers to enforce the criminal laws in the State of Utah'.
See Wright II, at 246.

The Utah Supreme Court once again reversed

the trial court and ordered the cause to be reinstated.

In its

opinion, the Supreme Court states:
We shall refer to the statute as it now
appears in the Utah Code Annotated 1943, as
Sec. 104-44-22. The section reads:
In any action brought against any sheriff,
constable, peace officer, state road officer,
or any other person charged with the duty of
enforcement of the criminal laws of this state,
or service of civil process, when any such
action arises out of, or in the course of,
the performance of his duty, or in any action
upon the bond of any such officer, the prevailing party therein shall, in addition to an
award of costs as otherwise provided by law,
recover from the losing party therein such sum
as counsel fees as shall be allowed by the court.
The official bond of any such officer shall be
liable for any such costs and attorney fees.

Had the section ended thus with the words
"attorney fees", this case would not have
arisen, nor would the case of Kiesel et. al.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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v. District Court, 96 Utah 156, 84 P.2d
782.
It is the last sentence of the section
not quoted above, to wit:
"Be fore any such '
action is filed" etc., that appears to have
been construed as though the words, "when
any such action arises out of, or in the
course of, the performance of his duty",
were not in the statute.
It takes more than
the fact of official position to make the last
sentence of the section applicable.
It must
either be alleged in the complaint or shown
by proof that the acts were official or so
related thereto as to establish official immunit;
The statute does not require the filing of
a bond "in any action brought" against any
person who happens to be a peace officer.
The statute cannot be construed as a cloak
to protect any peace officer by a bond as a
condition precedent merely be~ause of his
officical position and to prevent his being
sued without the bond for personal wrongs having
no relation to his official duties. Officers
should be protected to the limit within the
performance of their authorized acts and
imposed duties.
The language of the statute requires a
bond only "when any such action arises out
of, or in the course of, the performance
of his duty".
There is not a word in the
complaint about any of the defendants being
officers of any of the classes mentioned
in the statute, nor is there any mention
of any "bond" of such officer, nor that
any of the wrongs against plaintiff were in
any way related to any officer while in
"the performance of his duty".
The case of Kiesel et. al. v. District
Court, supra., on certiorari to this court
raised the question of jurisdiction of the
trial court to proceed with the trial of
an action against public officers after
denying a motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to file a bond under Sec. 10444-22, supra.
In the Kiesel case the suit
upon which the certiorari proceeding was
based was one against the city marshal of
Salina, Utah, and his deputy and the surety
upon their bonds.
\~e held that the failur_EO
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to file a bond before or at the time of
filing the complaint did not deprive the
court of jurisdiction to proceed. That
case differs from the instant case Irlthat
the instant case does not purport to be a
suit against public peace officers or upon
their bonds.
We are of the opinion the statute has not
shut the door against the right to bring
an action against any person, official or
otherwise, for a wrong committed and not
alleged to have any relation to or connection with official duties. It must therefore
follow that the judgment of dismissal was
erroneous.
The cause should be reinstated.
such is the order.
Costs to appellant.
(Emphasis added)
In Wright II,

Justice

Wades' concurring opinion

is especially helpful in its discussion as to the circumstances
under which a plaintiff may be required to post a bond.

Both

the concurring and majority opinions recognize that the test is
two-fold:

( 1)

Were the defendants charged with the enforcement

of the criminal laws? and

(2) were the acts of the defendants

committed in the course, or did they arise out of, the performance of their duty in enforcement of the criminal laws?

Justice

Wade pointed out that if both questions were answered in the
affirmative, the action was properly dismissed.

However, the

alleged facts had to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence
and, on appeal, there must be substantial evidence to support
the findings of the lower court.

Justice Wade concluded:

The defendants' evidence merely shows
that they were police officers, and as
such were instructed by their superior
to make an investigation of the plaintiff,
in connection with the writing of certain
letters and with certain robberies, and that
they made the arrest.
They further testified that all the acts, alleged in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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complaint, which they did, were done pursuant to and in furtherance of the instructions of their superior, and arose out of
or were in the course of the performance ~f
their duty as such officers. The testimony
on the matters stated in the last sentence
were the bald conclusions of the witnesses
and no facts or circumstances in support '
thereof were given.
In fact, the court expressly excluded such testimony.
The mere
fact that they were officers and were
instructed to make an investigation of the
plaintiff does not prove that the acts that
they did were done in the course of the
performance of their duty, nor does it prove
that their acts arose out of the performance
thereof.
Nor is this shown by the conclusion
to that effect.
Such testimony may be
admissable to show the purpose of the
witnesses in committing the a,cts, still that
question must be ultimately determined by~
the court from all of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission
of the acts in question.
These facts not
being disclosed, the evidence is insufficient
to justify the decision.
The court seemed to conclude that as
long as the defendants were officers, and
purporting to act as such, no matter how
far they went beyond their duty, still
plaintiff was required under the statute to
furnish an undertaking. Apparently on
this theory, all the evidence of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the acts
complained of were excluded. The court
stated that it was not interested in whether
the defendants acted in good or bad faith,
or with or without malice, or whether they
acted reasonably.
It intimated that it was
immaterial even though they were merely
"masquerading under the guise of police
officers", and made the arrest knowing the
plaintiff was guilty of no offense.
If I
have correctly interpreted the statute, it
was necessary for the defendants to show
either that they acted in the course of the
performance of their duty as police officers,
or if their acts did go beyond the course,
still their acts must arise out of the per- .. ,
formance of such duty.
Otherwise the plaintitc
was not required to furnish an undcrtnkin0.
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....
In the instant case, the trial court's ruling,
dismissing plaintiff's complaint solely because he did not post
a bond pursuant to §78-11-10, was in error.

The two Wright cases

clearly show that the trial court is required to make a factual
determination, which is not simply conclusory, as to whether
the defendants acts were done in the course of performance of
their duties.

No bond is required prior to this factual deter-

mination and if defendants were acting outside their official
capacity, no bond is required at all.

It is the theory of

.

plaintiff's complaint, that defendants' actions against him went
far beyond what is normally associated with the performance of
defendants' duties.

Plaintiff's complaint was carefully con-

structed so as to make clear that he was initiating a tort action
against the defendants as individuals, and not as police
officers, qua officers.

Accordingly, plaintiff did not name

Ogden City as a defendant nor does the caption of his complaint
refer to the defendants in their capacity as police officers.
Although the complaint, for purposes of clarity, does identify
the defendants as law officers, it does not recite that they were
acting within the performance of their duties as police officers.
Rather, the complaint twice alleges that defendants' acts were
far beyond the scope of normal police conduct.

(Complaint, 1111

7 & 10)
The instant case, therefore, falls squarely
within the holdings of the Wright cases and the trial court's
decision dismissing plaintiff's suit should be reversed and the
case reinstated.

The only evidence presented by defendants at
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the hearing on their Motion to Dismiss were affidavits signed
by the individual defendants declaring that they arrested
plaintiff in the course of performance of duties with the Ogde:
City Police Department and the arrest arose out of their duties
with the Department.

i

This evidcence is conclusory in nature anc,;

in accordance with the Wright cases, should not be dispositiw
of the issues raised herein.
POINT II.
WHEN A PLAINTIFF PROCEEDS IN FORMA
PAUPERIS BY FILING AN AFFIDAVIT OF
IMPECUNIOSITY, THE TRIAL COURK', IN ITS
DISCRETION, SHOULD WAIVE THE BOND SO
THAT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF PROVIDING
IN FORMA PAUPERIS PROCEEDINGS IS NOT
FRUSTRATED.
Utah, like many other states, has established
a procedure whereby impecunious litigants may appeal "any cause
of action in any court in this state" without paying any of
"necessary fees and costs".
et.

~-

t~

,

,

I
I

Utah Code Annotated (1953) §21- J· i

This section provides:
Any person may institute, prosecute,
defend and appeal any cause in any court
in this state by taking and subscribing,
before any officer authorized to administer an oath, the following:
I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the
expenses of the action or legal proceedings
which I am about to commence (or the appeal
which I am about to take) , and that I verily
believe I am justly entitled to the relief
sought by such action, legal proceedings or
appeal.

The following section, U.C.A. §21-7-4, further provides:
On such oath or affirmation being filed
with any justice of the peace or clerk of
any court, such justice of the peace or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Servicesclerk,
and Technologyas
Act, administered
by the Utah
State Library.
the case
may
be, shall at once
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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l

file any complaint or papers on appeal and
do any and all things necessary or proper
to be done as promptly as if such litigant
had fully paid all the regular fees; and the
constable or sheriff shall at once promptly
serve any and all surrunonses, writs, process
and subpoenas, and all papers necessary or
proper in the prosecution or defense of such
cause, for such poor person as if all the
necessary fees and costs had be fully paid;
provided, that in cases where an impeunious
affidavit is filed the judge at the time of
hearing the cause shall question the person
who filed such affidavit as to his ability
to pay and in the event that the judge is of
the opinion that such person is reasonably
able to pay the costs he shall direct that
judgment or decree be not entered in favor
of such person until such costs are paid.
Such order may be later cance.led upon petition
if the facts warrant such cancellation.
(Emphasis added)
As can been seen from the above statutes, if a person is determined to be impecunious, the court shall proceed "as if all the
necessary fees and costs had been paid", 21-7-4.

This latter

wording is broad enough to include waiving a bond such as that
required, when suing police officers, qua officers, by Utah Code
Annotated §78-11-10

(cited supra.).

The phrasing of §78-11-10

also allows for this interpretation:
... , the proposed plaintiff, as a condition
precedent thereto,
(i.e. filing the suit),
shall prepare and file with, and at the time
of filing the complaint in any such action,
a written undertaking with at least two
sufficient sureties in an amount to be fixed
by the court, ... (Emphasis added)
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The underlined language is broad enough to allow the trial
court judge to waive the posting of a bond in the case of
impecunious plaintiffs.

This result would seem to be

mandated by the statutory purposes of allowing impoverished
plaintiffs to proceed in forma pauperis, i.e. to allow them
their day in court for a full hearing of their claims.
an impecunious plaintiff cannot

If

even afford the filing fees,

how could the person afford the greater costs involved in
posting a bond?

To require an impecunious plaintiff to post

a bond would defeat the statutory intent

ot

i

Utah Code Annotateil

I

§21-7-3 et. seq. which allows an impecunious plaintiff to

'

conduct a lawsuit "as if all the necessary fees and costs
had been fully paid".

It is a rule of statutory constuction

that two statutes covering the same or similar subject matter
should be construed so as to preserve the integrity of
.

both.

1'

The Utah Supreme Court in the case of In Re Utah Savrnc;l

and Loan Association, 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 P. 2d 929, 931 (19681
stated the rule as follows:
... It is true here, as it is in so many
areas of the law, that one statute has
been enacted at one time with a particular
purpose in mind, and that another has been
enacted at another time with a different
purpose in mind.
When this has been done
and there is an apparent conflict, it is
not proper to put all the emphasis to one
statute, as though it stated all of the
law on the subject to the exclusion of the
other. They should be looked at together,
in their relationship to each other, with a
view to reconciling any such apparent
conflict and giving each its intended
effect insofar as that can be accomplished
without nullifying the other. 1
1.

University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah
457, 59
96, states:
"One act is n~
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to be allowed to defeat another, if by
reasonable construction the two can be
made to stand together." To the same
effect see also Western Beverage Co. of
Provo, Utah v. Hansen et al., 98 Utah
332, 96 P.2d llOS.
Therefore, appellant respectfully urges that the
court rule, as a matter of law, that where a plaintiff is
allowed to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §21-7-3 et.

~·

that the lower court ought to

waive other costs, including the bond required by Utah Code
Annotated §78-11-10 if the suit is against police officers,
as officers acting within the legitimate scope of their duties,
and against the officers' bonds.
POINT III.
TO REQUIRE A BOND UNDER UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED §78-11-10 IN ALL INSTANCES
IS A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH
AI1ENDi'1ENT TO THE UNITED STATE'S CONSTITUTION
AND OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND 11
OF UTAH'S CONSTITUTION.
The United States Su?reme Court in the case of
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,

( 1971)

held that to require fees of impecunious plaintiff's in a
divorce action and, consequently, to deny court access to those who were
unable to pay a fee was a violation of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The court stated:
American society, of course, bottoms
its systematic definition of individual
rights and duties, as well as its machinery
for dispute settlement, not on custom or
the will of strategically placed individuals,
but on the common-law model.
It is to
courts, or other quasi-judicial official
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implementation of a regularized, orderly
process of dispute settlement.
Within
this framework, those who wrote our
original Constitution, in the Fifth
Amendment, and later those who drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment recognized
the centrality of the concept of due
process in the operation of this system.
Without this guarantee that one may not
be deprived of his rights, neither liberty
nor property, without due process of law,
the State's monopoly over techniques for
binding conflict resolution could hardly
be said to be acceptable under our scheme
of things. Only by providing that the
social enforcement mechanism must
function strictly within these bounds can
we hope to maintain an ordered society
that is also just.
It is upon. this premise
that this Court has through years of adjudication put flesh upon the due process
principle.
Boddie v. Connecticut, supra.
The Court continued:
The arguments for this kind of fee and
cost requirement are that the State's
interest in the prevention of frivolous
litigation is substantial, its use of court
fees and process costs to allocate scarce
resources is rational, and its balance between the defendant's right to notice and
the plaintiff's right to access is reasonable.
In our opinion, none of these considerations
is sufficient to override the interest of
these plaintiff-appellants in having access
to the only avenue open for dissolving their
allegedly untenable marriages. Not only is
there no necessary connection between a
litigant's assets and the seriousness of his
motives in bringing suit, but is is here
beyond present dispute that appellants bring
these actions in good faith.
Moreover, other
alternatives exist to fees and cost requirements as a means for conserving the time of
courts and protecting parties from frivolous
litigation, such as ?enalties for false
pleadings or affidavits, and actions for
malicious prosecution or abuse of process,
to mention only a few.
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In concluding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that these appellants be afforded
an opportunity to go into court to obtain
a divorce, we wish to re-emphasize that we
go no further than necessary to dispose
of the case before us, a case where the
bonafides of both appellants' indigency
and desire for divorce are here beyond
dispute.
We do not decide that access
for all individuals to the courts is a
right that is, in all curicumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise
may not be placed beyond the reach of any
individual, for, as we have already noted,
in the case before us this right is the
exclusive precondition to the adjustment
of a fundamental human relationship. The
requirement that these appelhants resort to
the judicial process is entirely a statecreated matter. Thus we hold only that a
State may not, consistent with the obligations
imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, pre-exempt the
right to dissolve this legal relationship
without affording all citizens access to the
means it has prescribed for doing so.
In the instant case, if indeed the police officers
assaulted and committed a battery upon the plaintiff and exceeded
the legitimate scope of their authority and reasonableness,
the plaintiff's only redress is by using the courts.

The

courts are the exclusive means for plaintiff's redress of injuries in this situation.

To deny plaintiff access to the courts

merely because he is unable to obtain the bond mentioned in
U.C.A. §78-11-10 would be a violation of due process just as
clearly as was the denial of access in the Boddie case.
The Utah Constitution also supports plaintiff's
argument for access to the courts unrestricted by his economic status.
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Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done to him in his person, '
property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.
The mandated access is, for it speaks of "an injury done to
him in his person, property, or reputation".

The last clause

is especially instructive: "no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal. in the State, ...
any civil cause to which he is a party."

To foreclose plaintif' (

from bringing his civil action for personal injuries done to his r
I
person would conflict with Section 11 of Article I, Utah
!
Constitution.

Thus, it can be seen, that the right to a trial

for redress for a personal injury is an inalienable right

®~t

both the State and Federal Constitutions and should not be

i

denied a plaintiff merely because he is unable to pay for a bon·i
as required by U.C.A. §78-11-10.
California case of Beaudreau

This view is supported by the \

v. Superior Court of Los Angeles

County, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585, 535 P.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1975)
where the court struck down a similar bond requirement in
California before a plaintiff could sue a public employee.

the court held that requiring a bond was a taking of property,
within the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

I

.)
10
Constitut ','

and that no bond could be required prior to the c'Ourt holding a
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~~1

--a hearing as to the plaintiff's case.

The court stated:

The statutes before us make no provision
for such a hearing.
Every plaintiff who
sues a public entity or public employee
may be forced either to file an undertaking
as security for the defendant's costs or to
forego the prosecution of his claim. Absent
proof of indigency, the court is given no
discretion to dispense with the undertaking
requirement if demanded by a qualifying
defendant, regardless of the merit of the
plaintiff's lawsuit. Furthermore, the
legislation specifies no standards for
determining the reasonable amount of such
undertaking.
If the defendant is satisfied
to limit its demand to the statutory minimum,
judicial aoproval is not required; if the
defendant seeks a greater amQf.lnt, he must
show "good cause".
Yet the statutes do not
purport to define "good cause" and do not
provide that the plaintiff has a right to
be heard on this matter. Thus any hearing
which the plaintiff may receive on the issue
of good cause necessarily "excludes consideration of
element[s] essential to the
decision
(Bell v. Burson, supra.,
402 U.S. at p. 542, 91 s. Ct. at p. 1591).
It would not be a "meaningful" hearing,
"appropriate to the nature or the case" and
as such would not meet due process standards.
(Armstrong v. Manzo, supra., 380 U.S. at p. 552,
85 s. Ct. 1187; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., supra., 339, U.S. at p. 313, 70
S. Ct. 652).
Beaudreau v. Superior Court,
supr<:...:_, at 720.
It should be noted that the California case law had determined
prior to this time that an indigent plaintiff should not be
required to post any bond.

Thus, the California law was more

liberal than Utah's but still the statute was held to be
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Appellant is a poor person

and he has filed an

Affiuavit of Impecuniosity in order to pursue this action.

If

a person is determined to be impecunious the court shall proceed
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"as if all the necessary fees and costs had been paid", §27-H.
This latter wording is broad enough to include waiving a bo~
such as that required, when suing police officers, ~ officers
by Utah Code Annotated §78-11-10 .
In the instant case, if indeed the police office:oi
assaulted and conunitted a battery upon the plaintiff and exceede:'.
the legitimate scope of their authority and reasonableness, the
plaintiff's only redress is by using the courts.

I

The courts

are the exclusive possibility for plaintiff's redress of injuriesl,

.

in this situation and to deny plaintiff access merely
is unable to obtain the bond mentioned in U.C.A.

I

becau~~l

§78-11-10 would!

be a violation of due process.
Furthermore, the two Wright cases clearly show
I

that the trial court is required to make a factual

determinatio~,·

1

which is not simply conclusory, as to whether the defendants
acted outside the scope of their official duties.

No bond is

required prior to this factual determination and if

defend~U

1

were acting outside their official capacity, no bond is required
at all.
DATED this

~day

of November, 1980.

Respectfully Submitted:

-.
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

j

-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ERNIE ZAMORA,
Plaintiff,
Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
-vsLORIN DRAPER, ROBERT B.
CLEMENTS and JOE GREINER,
Defendants,
Respondents.

Case Number 17263

--------------------------------------------'--------------I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to SCOTT DANIELS, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU, Attorney for Defendants-Respondents, 700 Continental
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, via first class
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

this~~ of November, 1980.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

